

## Message Text

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 A-01 ABF-01 SCA-01 SSO-00 /014 W

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O 040308Z SEP 75

FM AMEMBASSY MANILA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7164

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E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: CASC, CI

SUBJECT: COMMENTS OF FSO FREDERICK PURDY ON GAO CHILE REPORT

FROM PURDY FOR FIMBRES, ARA/BC

REF: TELECON FIMBRES/PURDY EVENING SEPT 3, MANILA TIME

1. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO COMMENT IN THE DEPTH YOU APPEAR TO WANT WITHOUT HAVING IN FRONT OF ME FINAL TEXT OF GAO REPORT. I DID SEE A DRAFT IN GAO OFFICES IN DEPT IN LATE APRIL, BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH OF WORDING I SAW REMAINS IN FINAL. I SUGGESTED SOME CHANGES IN DRAFT, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO ACCURACY OF DETAILS AND TO ORIENTATION OF ITS THINKING. I DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY OF SUGGESTED CHANGES WERE MADE.

2. MY BASIC COMMENT TO GAO TEAM THEN WAS SAME AS WHEN THEY WERE IN SANTIAGO IN LATE 1974, NAMELY THAT THEIR JUDGMENTS REFLECTED GREAT DEAL OF HINDSIGHT AND THAT THEY APPARENTLY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO RECREATE MENTALLY THE ATMOSPHERE OF SANTIAGO IN SEPT 1973 AND WERE THUS ALSO UNABLE TO JUDGE WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE OF ACHIEVEMENT IN HELPING AMCITS AT THAT TIME.

3. REPORTED CHARGES OF LACK OF PREPARATION IN CONSULATE WITH RESPECT TO LACK OF PLANNING AND INCOMPLETE REGISTRATIONS REFLECT THIS UNREALISTIC READING OF THAT SITUATION. I DID NOT KNOW THAT COUP WAS GOING TO HAPPEN UNTIL MORNING OF SEPT 11 WHEN I ARRIVED AT WORK AND HEARD OF RADIO REPORTS IT WAS UNDERWAY.

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FROM WHAT I KNOW, I DON'T THINK OTHER OFFICERS OF EMBASSY KNEW

IN ADVANCE, EITHER. EMBASSY HAD E&E PLAN BUT IT DID NOT ANTICIPATE COUP-TYPE SITUATION OF TYPE THAT OCCURED.

4. REGISTRATION SYSTEM AT BEST IS A WEAK REED, DEPENDING AS IT DOES ON TWO FACTORS, REGISTRATION FOR CITIZENSHIP SERVICES AND/OR VOLUNTARY CONTACT WITH CONSULATE BY RESIDENT AMERICANS TO INFORM ABOUT THEIR WHEREABOUTS. CONSULATE HAD MADE COUNTS TO ESTIMATE NUMBER OF AMERICANS, BUT THAT INFO IN ITSELF IS NOT PARTICULARLY USEFUL. TO BE USEFUL, REGISTRATIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETE AND UP-TO-DATE WITH INFO ON HOW TO REACH AMCIT RESIDENTS. ONLY WAY TO HAVE GOTTEN SUCH INFO WOULD HAVE BEEN TO TELL AMCITS, PERHAPS THRU MEDIA, THAT THEY SHOULD REGISTER JUST IN CASE OF POSSIBLE TROUBLES. BUT I REPEAT THAT CONSULATE HAD NO INDICATION BEFORE SEPT 11 THAT SIGNIFICANT TROUBLE WOULD OCCUR, ESPECIALLY NOT OF TYPE THAT FINALLY HAPPENED. AND EVEN AFTER SEPT 11 WE HAD NO INDICATIONS THAT AMERICANS WOULD BE DETAINED IN NUMBERS THAT THEY WERE, NOR THAT JUNTA WOULD BE SO UNRESPONSIVE TO OUR PLEAS FOR RELEASE OR FOR INFO ON REASONS AND CONDITIONS FOR DETENTION, NOR THAT TWO AMCITS WOULD BE KILLED UNDER STILL-UNEXPLAINED CIRCUMSTANCES. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT NEITHER OF THESE TWO AMCITS NOR HALF OF THOSE DETAINED HAD REGISTERED AT CONSULATE, EITHER BEFORE SEPT 11 OR IN APPROX FIRST TEN DAYS AFTER COUP. IN LATTER PERIOD THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT KEEPING CONSULATE POSTED ON THEIR WHEREABOUTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN IN THEIR OWN INTEREST. GIVEN APPARENT ANTI-PATHY OF MANY OF THEM TO EMBASSY AND ITS ALLEGED (BY THEM) ANTI-ALLENDE BIAS, IT IS DOUBTFUL MANY OF THEM WOULD HAVE REGISTERED AT ANY TIME. BUT EVEN IF THEY HAD BEEN REGISTERED, IT WOULD NOT HAVE MADE MUCH DIFFERENCE. AS IT TURNED OUT, BOTH AMCITS KILLED WERE ALREADY DEAD BEFORE WE KNEW THEY HAD BEEN PICKED UP OR WERE MISSING. AND WE HAD JUST AS MUCH LUCK OBTAINING RELEASE OF UNREGISTERED AMCITS AS WITH REGISTERED ONES.

5. AS FOR WHAT WAS DONE AND WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DONE AFTER SEPT 11, I BELIEVE CONSULATE DID AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES TO HELP AMCITS. WE PROVIDED WELFARE/WHEREABOUTS SERVICES FOR OVER 600 AMCITS WHO WERE EITHER TRYING TO INFORM RELATIVES IN US OR ABOUT WHOM INFO WAS SOUGHT BY SOMEONE IN US. WE SECURED SAFE CONDUCTS FOR CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF AMCITS WHO NEEDED THEM, AND PROVIDED OTHER IDENTITY DOCUMENTS FOR OTHERS AS APPRO-

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PRIMATE TO THEIR SITUATIONS. ON NIGHT OF SEPT 18/19 I CAME DOWN TO CONSULATE, DURING DANGEROUS AFTER-CURFEW SITUATION, AND PHONED NUMEROUS AMCITS (WHO HAD INDICATED ANXIETY TO LEAVE CHILE ASAP) ABOUT UN CHARTER FLIGHT NEXT DAY -- WHICH WE HAD HEARD ABOUT ON SHORT NOTICE. WE FINALLY GOT 31 PERSONS ON THAT FLIGHT, BUT SEVERAL WHO HAD INDICATED URGENCY IN DEPARTING CHILE COULD NOT BE REACHED AT THE PHONE NUMBERS THEY HAD GIVEN US, SOME ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE.

6. WHAT MORE COULD HAVE BEEN DONE? I SUPPOSE WE MIGHT HAVE ASKED PERMISSION OF THE JUNTA TO PUBLICIZE, THRU CONTROLLED RADIO AND/OR NEWSPAPERS, A CALL FOR REGISTRATION. THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MISINTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION THAT BIGGER PROBLEMS WERE ANTICIPATED. AND TO WHAT PURPOSE IF EVACUATION WERE NOT CONTEMPLATED? I REMEMBER THAT THE AMBASSADOR WANTED TO AVOID GETTING PEOPLE EXCITED UNNECESSARILY.

7. AS TO THE CRITICISM THAT CONSULATE STAFF WAS NOT INCREASED, THIS IS FULLY TRUE. AS WE HAD SUSPENDED VISA SERVICES FOR ALMOST TWO WEEKS, THE SCS STAFF WAS, IN EFFECT, INCREASED FROM ONE TO FIVE OFFICERS IMMEDIATELY AFTER SEPT 11. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT MORE HELP COULD BE USED, WE GOT SERVICES OF ANOTHER VICE CONSUL AND, FOR SHORT PERIODS, TWO AMERICAN SECRETARIES. BUT ONCE AGAIN, IT APPEARED AT THAT TIME THAT WE WERE DOING ALL THAT WAS NECESSARY OR THAT COULD BE DONE. IT IS ONLY IN HINDSIGHT THAT I (AND GAO, TOO) NOW REALIZE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HANDY TO HAVE HAD EXTRA HELP EVEN IF IT WERE NOT BEING USED ALL THE TIME. I SUGGEST THAT THE DEPT MAKE IT A POLICY THAT CONSULAR STAFFS BE AUGMENTED AUTOMATICALLY IN TIMES OF CRISIS, PERHAPS AT EXPENSE OF POL AND ECON SECTIONS, JUST IN CASE THEY ARE NEEDED AND EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT USED.

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FM AMEMBASSY MANILA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7165

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8. THE CRITICISM THAT WE DID NOT ASSIGN ANYONE TO HANDLE REGISTRATIONS AT THE EMBASSY BEARS SOME COMMENT. FOR THE FIRST FEW DAYS W/W INQUIRIES, BOTH FROM US AND FROM AMCITS IN CHILE CALLING THE EMBASSY, WERE HANDLED IN PART BY PERSONNEL ON 24-HOUR

WATCH IN THE CHANCERY BUILDING. AFTER A FEW DAYS, THERE WAS NO IMPEDIMENT NOR DANGER TOPERSONS COMING FROM CHANCERY TO

CONSULATE. THIS CRITICISM IS APPARENTLY GENERATED BYTHE CASE OF ONE OF THE DEAD AMCITS WHO, WHEN TOLD AT THE CHANCERY TO GO TO THE CONSULATE DID NOT DO SO, EVEN THOUGH HIS ROUTE HOME LED HIM ONLY ONLY BLOCK AWAY. PERHAPS IF HE HAD COME TO CONSULATE HE WOULD HAVE MISSED BEING PICKED UP BY WHOEVER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS DISAPPEARANCE. BUT EVEN IF HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO REGIS-TER AT THE CHANCERY, IT WOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED THE FACT THAT HE WAS ALREADY DEAD BEFORE WE KNEW HE HAD DISAPPEARED. HOWEVER, THE IDEA OF REGISTRATIONS AT ALL MISSION BUILDINGS, EVEN IF IT CAUSES SOME DUPLICATION AND CONFUSION, IS ONE THAT ALL EMBASSIES WITH DIVIDED FACILITIES MIGHT WELL ADOPT IN TIMES

OF CRISIS, JUST IN CASE IT TURNS OUT TO BE USEFUL.

9. QUESTION OF WHY EMBASSY MADE NO REPRESENTATION UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND WHY WE WERE NOT "MORE AGGRESSIVE OR ENERGETIC AT A HIGHER LEVEL" SHOULD, I BELIEVE, BE ANSWERED AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN MINE. THE CONSULATE STAFF DID WHAT IT COULD, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IN THE MOST PRACTICAL MANNER POSSIBLE, USUALLY ON AN INFORMAL BASIS. A FEW DAYS AFTER THE COUP, WHEN WE THOUGHTWE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET ONLY A FEW PERSONS OUT ON THE THEN-RATHER-NEBULOUS UN FLIGHT, I PREPARED A REQUEST LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FOR SAFE CONDUCTS ON OFFICIAL STATIONERY, SIGNED THEM MYSELF AND DELIVERED THEM TO THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL OF THE STILL-IN -DISARRY FOREIGN OFFICE. HE ACCEPTED THEM AND PROMISED QUICK ACTION. WHEN I GOT BACK TO THE CONSULATE THERE WAS A MESSAGE FROM THE EMBASSY TELLING ME TO WITHDRAW THE REQUESTS BECAUSE IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AN INDICATION OF RECOGNITION OF THE NEW REGIME. BECAUSE OF MY PERSONAL, INFORMAL CONTACTS, I WAS ABLE TO GET THE REQUESTS BACK WITHOUT TROUBLE AND HAVE NEW ONES, ON PLAIN PAPER, ACCEPTED. BUT THE INABILITY TO TALK WITH THE NEW REGIME ON THE FORMAL LEVEL VALUED BY LATINS MAY WELL HAVE HAMPERED OUR EFFORTS. IT IS HARD TO TELL. PERHAPS GAO SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE CHILEANS IF IT DID.

10. MANY TIMES WE DID NOT GET THE ATTENTION OR RECEPTIVITY THAT I THOUGHT WE SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN AT THE NATIONAL STADIUM WHEN INQUIRING ABOUT DETAINEES. THIS SEEMED TO BE BECAUSE THE OFFICERS WITH WHOM WE HAD TO TALK HAD ORDERS TO BE VERY STRICT ABOUT ACCESS TO PRISONERS. WHAT WAS APPARENTLY LACKING WAS ORDERS FROM HIGH UP IN THE CHILEAN MILITARY STURCTURE TO GIVE US -- AND OTHER FOREIGN CONSULS, PERHAPS -- ASSISTANCE AND ACCESS. BUT AT THAT TIME THE CONSULTATE'S AND THE EMBASSY'S ONLY ACCESS TO THE CHILEAN MILITARY WHO HAD TAKEN POWER WAS THRU DAO CONTACTS, AND NO ONE KNEW WHO REALLY WAS IN

CHARGE AND WHO HAD THE POWER TO DO WHAT. IT IS HARD TO TELL WHETHER EARLIER RECOGNITION WOULD HAVE CHANGED THAT SITUATION. THE EXAMPLES OF WHAT MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION ACHIEVED -- SUCH AS THE ONE DUTCH VICE CONSUL WHO GOT INTO THE STADIUM ON TWO OCCASIONS -- ARE VERY FEW AND MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH EITHER RECOGNITION, AGGRESSIVENESS OR ENERGY. THEY MAY HAVE BEEN PURE LUCK. WE WERE ALSO LUCKY IN SOME CASES -- BUT NOT IN OTHERS.

1. USING THE SAME HINDSIGHT AVAILABLE TO GAO, I THINK THE EMBASSY SHOULD HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MAKE CONTACTS WITH THE NEW JUNTA AT A HIGH LEVEL EARLY IN THE GAME. I SUGGEST THAT IT BE THE POLICY OF THE US IN THE FUTURE TO HAVE THE AMBASSADOR OR OTHER HIGH OFFICIAL GO TO TALK WITH THE APPARENT CHIEFS OF NEW REGIMES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO GET BASIC RELATIONSHIPS UNDERSTOOD. THAT ENVOY MIGHT WELL POINT OUT THAT WE ARE REALISTS WHO DO BUSINESS WITH ALL TYPES OF GOVERNMENTS AND THAT WE WANT TO DO BUSINESS WITH THEIR GOVERNMENT, WITHOUT ANY VALUE JUDGMENTS. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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HE WOULD STRESS THAT WE INSIST UPON VIENNA CONVENTION RIGHTS FOR OUR NATIONALS AND THAT ANY MISTREATMENT OF THEM WOULD CERTAINLY HAMPER OUR ABILITY TO GET ALONG WITH THE NEW REGIME. THIS LATTER IS CERTAINLY WHAT HAPPENED IN CHILE. PERHAPS MY TYPE OF SUGGESTED OVERTURE WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE MISFORTUNES THAT BEFELL SOME AMERICANS IN CHILE, AND PERHAPS IT AVOIDED SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE BEFALLEN US-CHILE RELATIONSHIPS.

12. I WILL BE PLEASED TO RESPOND FURTHER, IF NECESSARY, WHEN I SEE THE FINAL GAO REPORT. SULLIVAN

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